Philosophy of language and cognition

Code
570502
Credits
5cr

Goals

In this course, we will examine a central part of the conceptual and empirical foundations of the relation between language, the mind, and the world. The first part of the course will focus on how the world is represented through language in speech (assertion). The key aim will be to introduce students to central debates on assertion, covering its broader philosophical relevance (week 1), its nature (weeks 2 and 3), its norms (week 4), concluding with an exploration of the available empirical literature on these issues (week 5). 

The second part of the course will explore how the world is represented in perception and thought. The key aim is to discuss the nature of the content of perception (weeks 6 and 7), the richness of perception, i.e., which properties can or cannot be perceptually represented (week 8), whether perception is modulated or not by background cognitive states and processes (week 9), concluding with the discussion of a particular case of cognitive and perceptual distortions: implicit attitudes (week 10). 

 

Course plan

First Part: Language, Mind, and the World. Dario Mortini. Weeks 1-5 

Week 1:    The philosophical importance of assertion 

Week 2:    The nature of assertion: four views      

Week 3:    The nature of assertion: the no-assertion view 

Week 4:    Norms of assertion: the knowledge rule 

Week 5:    Norms of assertion: experimental data 

 

Second Part: Mind, and the World.  Pepa Toribio. Weeks 6-10 

Week 6:    Representing the world in perception. The conceptualism / nonconceptualism debate (I) 

Week 7:    Representing the world in perception. The conceptualism / nonconceptualism debate (II) 

Week 8:    Representing the world in perception. The liberalism / conservatism debate 

Week 9:    Cognitive penetration  

Week 10:  Cognitive distortions: Implicit attitudes 

The course will be taught in English. All material subject to assessment must be written in English. Classes begin on October 14th. Classes end on December 16th. 

There will be an in-class exam on January 13th (10 a.m. to 1 p.m.).

Readings: Primary class readings are the required readings to be completed before the class they are assigned for. All primary readings will be electronically accessible and are listed below. Sometimes, secondary (optional) readings will be provided during the course. The instructors will not assume familiarity with these other readings.

 

Assessment

Participation: Take notes while you are reading. Write down any aspect of the reading that you find interesting. This would help force you to engage the reading in a serious way so that you’ll be primed to participate actively in the discussion. Participation (that meets the standards) will have a real impact on the final grade. If a student finds class participation hard in any way, they should contact us in advance. We will look for alternatives together.

Examination: All students have to sit an in-class exam with two sets of questions, one from each part of the course. Each student must answer two questions from each set. The 3-hour exam will take place on January 13th (10 a.m. to 1 p.m.).

Assessment: 20% for in-class activity, 80% for the in-class exam.

(Guidelines on evaluation and marking, including a note on originality and plagiarism, are available at http://www.ub.edu/aphil/en/guidelines-on-evaluation-and-marking-8).  

Reassessment: Students who fail to pass this course, but obtain more than a 3 in the exam, will be offered the opportunity to sit another in-class exam, which will take place on February 3rd (10:00-13:00). Even if this second exam exhibits great academic quality, the student will only be granted a 5 as a final mark. 

 

Examination-based assessment

Under exceptional and justified circumstances, a single examination (100% of the grade) can be scheduled. 
Re-evaluation of this assessment can only be considered for students having failed with grades ranging from 3 to 4.9. The maximum final grade can only be 5.

 

Useful websites on how to write philosophy papers

Writing a Philosophy Paper (Peter Horban)
Guide to the Study of Philosophy (Garth Kemerling):
Tips on Writing a Philosophy Paper (Douglas Portmore):
Guidelines on Writing a Philosophy Paper (James Pryor):
Avoiding and Detecting Plagiarism (CUNY Guidelines)

 

Course Outline

FIRST PART – Language, Mind, and the World (Dario Mortini): 

Week 1: The Philosophical Importance of Assertion 

Mandatory reading: 

  • Brown, Jessica & Cappelen, Herman (2011). Assertion: An introduction and overview. In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-17. 

Recommended readings: 

  • ‘Introduction: Assertion among the Speech Acts’, in Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion (2020; online edn, Oxford Academic, 7 Nov. 2018). 

 

Week 2: The Nature of Assertion: Four Views 

Mandatory reading: 

  • MacFarlane, John (2011). ‘What Is Assertion’. In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. 

Recommended readings: 

  • Shapiro, Lionel (2018). ‘Commitment Accounts of Assertion’. In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press. 

  • Benton, Matthew A. & Van Elswyk, Peter (2018). ‘Hedged Assertion’. In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press. pp. 245-263. 

 

Week 3: The Nature of Assertion: The No-Assertion View 

Mandatory reading: 

  • Cappelen, Herman (2020). ‘Assertion: A Defective Theoretical Category’. In Goldberg Sanford (ed.), Oxford Handbook on Assertion. Oxford University Press. 

Recommended readings: 

  • Simion, Mona & Kelp, Christoph (2018). ‘The constitutive norm view of assertion’. In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press. 

  • Maitra, Ishani (2011). ‘Assertion, norms, and games’. In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 277-296

 

Week 4: Norms of Assertion: The Knowledge Rule 

Mandatory reading: 

  • Benton, Matthew A. (2024). ‘Knowledge is the Norm of Assertion’. In Blake Roeber, Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 329-339. 

Recommended readings: 

  • McGlynn, Aidan (2014). Knowledge First? New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan [Chapter 4: Assertion (especially pages 82-95)]. 

  • Williamson, Timothy (2000). Knowledge and its limits. New York: Oxford University Press [Chapter 11]. 

 

Week 5: Norms of Assertion: Experimental Data 

Mandatory reading: 

  • Turri, John (2013). ‘The test of truth: An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion’. Cognition 129 (2):279-291. 

Recommended readings: 

  • Gerken, Mikkel (2020). ‘Truth‐Sensitivity and Folk Epistemology’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1):3-25. 

  • Kneer, Markus & Marsili, Neri (forthcoming). ‘The truth about assertion and retraction: A review of the empirical literature’. In Alex Wiegmann (ed.), Lying, Fake News, and Bullshit. Bloomsbury. 

 

SECOND PART - Mind and the World (Prof. Josefa Toribio) 

Weeks 6 and 7: Representing the world in perception: The conceptualism / nonconceptualism debate (I and II) 

Mandatory reading: 

  • J. McDowell (2009). ‘Avoiding the Myth of the Given’. In John McDowell: Experience, Norm, and Nature (ed. J. Lindgaard), Blackwell Publishing Ltd., Oxford, UK. doi: 10.1002/9781444306736. Chapter 1. 

  • J. Toribio (2007). ‘Nonconceptual Content’. Philosophy Compass 2/3: 445–460. 

 

Week 8: Representing the world in perception: The liberalism / conservatism debate 

Mandatory reading: 

  • Susanna Siegel (2006). ‘Which properties are represented in perception?’ In T. S. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.): Perceptual Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 

Recommended reading: 

  • B. Nanay, (2011). ‘Do we see apples as edible?’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92: 305–322. 

 

Week 9: Cognitive penetration 

Mandatory reading: 

  • F. Macpherson (2012) ‘Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of an Indirect Mechanism’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 84(1): 24-62. 

Recommended reading: 

  • Pylyshyn, Z. (1999). ‘Is vision continuous with cognition? The case for cognitive impenetrability of visual perception’. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22: 341–365. 

 

Week 10: Cognitive distortions: Implicit attitudes 

Mandatory reading: 

  • Mandelbaum, E. (2016). ‘Attitude, association, and inference: On the propositional structure of implicit bias’. Noûs 50(3): 629–658. 

Recommended reading: 

  • Toribio, J. (2018). ‘Implicit biases: from social structure to representational format’. Theoria 33(1): 41–60.