Philosophy of language and cognition

Goals

In this course, we will examine a central part of the conceptual and empirical foundations of the relation between language, our minds, and the world. The discussion will focus on three different aspects of that relation: (i) reference as the purely semantic connection between words and the pieces of the world those words represent; (ii) communication as connecting language and world, as well as the mind; and (iii) cognitive events, states and processes which need not be linguistic, but which nevertheless represent the world as being a particular (sometimes distorted) way. Each vertex of this triangle will have a specific research domain so as to make the course manageable.

Course plan

First Part: Language, Mind, and the World. Dr Daniel Gregory. Weeks 1-5
Week 1: Descriptive theory of reference
Week 2: Causal theory of reference
Week 3: Causal theory of reference
Week 4: Causal theory of reference
Week 5: Communication

Second Part: Mind, and the World. Professor Josefa Toribio. Weeks 6-10
Week 6: Representing the world in perception. The conceptualism /
nonconceptualism debate
Week 7: Representing the world in perception. The liberalism / conservatism debate
Week 8: Cognitive penetration
Week 9: Cognitive distortions: Implicit attitudes
Week 10: Implicit attitudes and the justification of beliefs

The course will be taught in English. All material subject to assessment must be written in English. Classes begin on October 9th. Classes end on December 11th.

Assessment

10% for in-class activity, 30% for the question assignment, 60% for the in-class exam.

Readings

Primary class readings are the required readings to be completed before the class they are assigned for. All primary readings will be electronically accessible and are listed below. Sometimes, secondary (optional) readings will be provided during the course. The instructors will not assume familiarity with these other readings.

Class Assignments

In each session, every student will prepare a question about the readings for that day. This question should be submitted to all the instructors by email the previous Friday by 12:00 noon. We will decide which ones of these questions should be posed during the class. This activity will contribute 30% to the final grade. The question should address a particular aspect of one of the required readings for the day. In posing such questions, you should aim at the standards operative in the discussion of communications at professional philosophy conferences, or research seminars: their evaluation will depend on how well the target thesis is summarised, how clearly the objection is presented, and how relevant it is. The question should not take more than 2 or 3 minutes to formulate. See (http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/03/how-to-ask-questions-at-conferences-and-colloquia.html) for more advice on question asking at academic conferences.

Participation

Other than the students whose questions have been selected for discussion, all other students are expected to participate and meet the same standards. Participation (that meets the standards) will have a real impact on the final grade. Take notes while you are reading. Write down any aspect of the reading that you find interesting. This would help force you to engage the reading in a serious way so that you’ll be primed to participate actively in the discussion.

Exam

All students will have to sit an in-class exam with two sets of questions, one from each part of the course. Each student must answer two questions (one thousand word maximum per question) from each set. The 3-hour exam will take place on January 8th (10:00-13:00).

Re-evaluation

Students who fail to pass this course, but obtain more than a 3 in the exam, will be offered the opportunity to sit another in-class exam, which will take place on February 5th (10:00-13:00). Even if this second exam exhibits great academic quality, the student will only be granted a 5 as a final mark.

 

Useful websites on how to write philosophy papers

Writing a Philosophy Paper (Peter Horban)
Guide to the Study of Philosophy (Garth Kemerling):
Tips on Writing a Philosophy Paper (Douglas Portmore):
Guidelines on Writing a Philosophy Paper (James Pryor):
Avoiding and Detecting Plagiarism (CUNY Guidelines)
 

Bibliography

FIRST PART – Language, Mind, and the World (Dr Daniel Gregory):

Week 1: Descriptive theory of reference
• G. Frege (1892/1948). “Sense and Reference”. Philosophical Review, 57: 209- 230, pp. 209-214
• B. Russell (1905). “On Denoting”. Mind, 14(56): 479-493.

Week 2: Causal theory of reference
• S. A. Kripke (1983), Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University
Press. Lecture I.

Week 3: Causal theory of reference
• S. A. Kripke (1983), Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University
Press. Lecture II.

Week 4: Causal theory of reference.
• S. A. Kripke (1983), Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University
Press. Lecture III.

Week 5: Communication
• H. P. Grice (1967/1989). “Logic and Conversation”. In. H. P. Grice, Studies in the
Way of Words. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press. Chapter 2, pp. 22-40.

SECOND PART - Mind and the World (Prof. Josefa Toribio)

Week 6: Representing the world in perception: The conceptualism / nonconceptualism
debate.
• J. McDowell (2009). “Avoiding the Myth of the Given”. In John McDowell:
Experience, Norm, and Nature (ed. J. Lindgaard), Blackwell Publishing Ltd.,
Oxford, UK. doi: 10.1002/9781444306736. Chapter 1.
• J. Toribio (2007). ‘Nonconceptual Content’. Philosophy Compass 2/3: 445–460.

Week 7: Representing the world in perception: The liberalism / conservatism debate.
• Susanna Siegel (2006). “Which properties are represented in perception?” In T. S.
Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.): Perceptual Experience. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2006.

Optional:
• B. Nanay, (2011). “Do we see apples as edible?” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
92: 305–322.

Week 8: Cognitive penetration
• F. Macpherson (2012) “Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of an Indirect Mechanism”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 84(1): 24-62.
Optional:
• Pylyshyn, Z. (1999). Is vision continuous with cognition? The case for cognitive impenetrability of visual perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22: 341–365.

Week 9: Cognitive distortions: Implicit attitudes
• Mandelbaum, E. (2016). Attitude, association, and inference: On the propositional structure of implicit bias. Noûs 50(3): 629–658.
Optional:
• Toribio, J. (2018). Implicit biases: from social structure to representational format.
Theoria 33(1): 41–60.

Week 10: Implicit attitudes and the justification of beliefs

• Puddifoot, K. (2016). Accessibilism and the challenge from implicit bias. Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly, 97: 421–434.
Optional:
• Toribio, J. (2018). Accessibilism, implicit bias, and epistemic justification.
Synthese. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-018-1795-7