Philosophy of language and cognition

Code
570502
Credits
5cr

Goals

In this course, we will examine a central part of the conceptual and empirical foundations of the relation between language, our minds, and the world. The discussion will focus on three different aspects of that relation: (i) reference as the purely semantic connection between words and the pieces of the world those words represent; (ii) the nature of the mind, as seen under the light of the semantic theories presented in (i); and (iii) cognitive events, states and processes which need not be linguistic, but which nevertheless represent the world as being a particular (sometimes distorted) way. Each vertex of this triangle will have a specific research domain so as to make the course manageable.

 

Course plan

First Part: Language, Mind, and the World. (Carlota Serrahima)

  • Week 1: Basic notions. Millian theory of reference.
  • Week 2: Descriptivist theory of reference: Frege puzzles and modes of presentation. 
    • Frege, G. (1892/1948). Sense and Reference. Philosophical Review, 57, 209-230, pp.209-214.
  • Week 3: Direct reference theory: Kripke's semantic argument.
    • Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, Massachussets: Harvard University Press. Lecture I + pp. 83-85 (excerpt from Lecture II).
  • Week 4: Direct reference theory: Kripke’s modal argument and the meaning of ‘pain’
    • Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, Massachussets: Harvard University Press, pp. 144-155 (excerpt from Lecture III).
    • (Optional) Balog, K. (1999). Conceivability, possibility, and the mind-body problem. Philosophical Review 108 (4):497-528.
  • Week 5: The explanatory gap
    • Levine, J. (1983). Materialism and Qualia: the Explanatory Gap. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64, pp. 354-361. 
    • Churchland, P.S. (1996). The Hornswoggle Problem. Journal of Consciousness Study, 3, 5-6, pp. 402-408. 
    • (Optional) Díaz-León, E. (2010). Can Phenomenal Concepts Explain the Epistemic Gap?. Mind, 119, 476, pp.933-951.

Second Part: Mind, and the World. Professor Josefa Toribio. Weeks 6-10

  • Week 6 and 7: Representing the world in perception. The conceptualism / nonconceptualism debate.
    • J. McDowell (2009). “Avoiding the Myth of the Given”. In John McDowell: Experience, Norm, and Nature (ed. J. Lindgaard), Blackwell Publishing Ltd., Oxford, UK. doi: 10.1002/9781444306736. Chapter 1.
    • J. Toribio (2007). ‘Nonconceptual Content’. Philosophy Compass 2/3: 445–460.
  • Week 8: Representing the world in perception: The liberalism / conservatism debate.
    • Susanna Siegel (2006). “Which properties are represented in perception?” In T. S. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.): Perceptual Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
    • Optional: B. Nanay, (2011). “Do we see apples as edible?” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92: 305–322.
  • Week 9: Cognitive penetration
    • F. Macpherson (2012) “Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of an Indirect Mechanism”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 84(1): 24-62.
    • Optional: Pylyshyn, Z. (1999). Is vision continuous with cognition? The case for cognitive impenetrability of visual perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22: 341–365.
  • Week 10: Cognitive distortions: Implicit attitudes
    • Mandelbaum, E. (2016). Attitude, association, and inference: On the propositional structure of implicit bias. Noûs 50(3): 629–658.
    • Optional: Toribio, J. (2018). Implicit biases: from social structure to representational format. Theoria 33(1): 41–60.

The course will be taught in English. All material subject to assessment must be written in English. Classes begin on October 14th. Classes end on December 16th. 
There will be an in-class exam on January 13th (10 a.m. to 1 p.m.).

Readings: Primary class readings are the required readings to be completed before the class they are assigned for. All primary readings will be electronically accessible and are listed on the syllabus. Sometimes, secondary (optional) readings will be provided during the course. The instructors will not assume familiarity with these other readings.

 

Assessment

Participation: Take notes while you are reading. Write down any aspect of the reading that you find interesting. This would help force you to engage the reading in a serious way so that you’ll be primed to participate actively in the discussion. Participation (that meets the standards) will have a real impact on the final grade. If a student finds class participation hard in any way, they should contact us in advance. We will look for alternatives together.

Examination: All students have to sit an in-class exam with two sets of questions, one from each part of the course. Each student must answer two questions from each set. The 3-hour exam will take place on January 13th (10 a.m. to 1 p.m.).

Assessment: 20% for in-class activity, 80% for the in-class exam.

(Guidelines on evaluation and marking, including a note on originality and plagiarism, are available at http://www.ub.edu/aphil/en/guidelines-on-evaluation-and-marking-8).  

Reassessment: Students who fail to pass this course, but obtain more than a 3 in the exam, will be offered the opportunity to sit another in-class exam, which will take place on February 3rd (10:00-13:00). Even if this second exam exhibits great academic quality, the student will only be granted a 5 as a final mark. 

 

Examination-based assessment

Under exceptional and justified circumstances, a single examination (100% of the grade) can be scheduled. 
Re-evaluation of this assessment can only be considered for students having failed with grades ranging from 3 to 4.9. The maximum final grade can only be 5.

 

Useful websites on how to write philosophy papers

Writing a Philosophy Paper (Peter Horban)
Guide to the Study of Philosophy (Garth Kemerling):
Tips on Writing a Philosophy Paper (Douglas Portmore):
Guidelines on Writing a Philosophy Paper (James Pryor):
Avoiding and Detecting Plagiarism (CUNY Guidelines)